Interspousal Electronic Surveillance and Title III by unknown
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 12 
Number 3 Spring 1978 pp.537-568 
Spring 1978 
Interspousal Electronic Surveillance and Title III 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Interspousal Electronic Surveillance and Title III, 12 Val. U. L. Rev. 537 (1978). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol12/iss3/3 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
NOTES
INTERSPOUSAL ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE AND TITLE III
The actors are, it seems, the
usual three:
Husband, and wife, and lover.*
The intrigue which has always surrounded husband, wife, and
the extra-marital lover has recently taken on a new sophistication.
Electronic surveillance devices have become the tools of suspicious
spouses seeking factual evidence of their marital partners' in-
fidelities for use at divorce, custody, and support hearings.' While
the full extent of intermarital spying cannot be documented, it is
likely that it occurs with surprising frequency! Interspousal elec-
tronic surveillance, a natural result of the contemporaneous increase
in marital disharmony3 and technological developments, has proved
itself to be a difficult legal subject in the courts.
In the few intermarital electronic surveillance cases which have
reached the courts, the central issue has been the applicability and
effect of Title III, of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968.' The passage of Title III was a congressional response
to the widespread use and abuse of electronic surveillance devices
within the United States.' The Act's dual purpose is to protect the
privacy of all oral and wire communications and to define the cir-
cumstances in which governmental electronic surveillance is per-
missible.6 The provisions of Title III prohibit all private interception
of wire communication7 and provide that the fruits of such sur-
* GEORGE MEREDITH, Modern Love IV.
1. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 111 (1967).
2. "Several leading investigators have suggested to the author that forty to
seventy-five per cent of the average private investigator's surveillance is done in
,matrimonial' cases." Id
3. One in three marriages ends in divorce. See K. DECROW, SEXIST JUSTICE
161 (1974).
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. (1970).
5. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2153 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1097].
6. Id
7. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1)(a) (1970).
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veillance are inadmissible in all judicial proceedings.' Additionally,
the Act prescribes both civil and criminal penalties for those who
violate its proscriptions.'
Despite the plain language of Title III, some courts ° have
refused to apply the prohibitions and penalties of the Act to inter-
marital surveillance. These courts hold that Congress did not intend
Title III to prohibit interspousal electronic surveillance." Decisions
which have held that there is an interspousal exception to Title III
are the result of judicial concern over the Act's effect on our
federalist system and the insitution of marriage. These courts assert
that if the Act would be found to provide a federal remedy for a
marital grievance, the traditionally exclusive power of the states to
regulate domestic conflicts would be usurped. 2 They also emphasize
that in civil cases the application of Title III would abrogate the doc-
trine of interspousal immunity still in effect in a majority of the
states.3 Finally, these courts express reluctance to impose between
marital partners the individual privacy protections contained in the
Act."4 Notwithstanding these grounds for establishing an in-
terspousal exception to Title III, other courts have held that the
federal legislation does control intermarital electronic surveillance. 5
While the foremost question raised in present case law is
whether Title III's provisions govern interspousal electronic
surveillance, the lack of uniformity among the courts regarding the
applicability of Title III has left other legal issues unsettled. Though
some authority presently exists for an interspousal exception to
Title II,"6 courts have had difficulty determining the particular fac-
tual circumstances in which interspousal immunity to Title III
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970).
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2520 (1970).
10. Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 897
(1974); Beaber v. Beaber, 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 322 N.E.2d 910 (1974).
11. Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 897
(1974); Beaber v Beaber, 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 322 N.E.2d 910, 914 (1974).
12. See, e.g., Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 897 (1974).
13. Id. at 806 n.7.
14. Id. at 805.
15. United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976); Remington v. Rem-
ington, 393 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Rickenbacker v. Rickenbacker, 290 N.C. 373,
226 S.E.2d 347 (1976).
16. Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 897
(1974).
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should be a valid defense. 7 In addition, the courts have not reached
agreement on whether the fruits of intermarital electronic
surveillance are admissible in domestic hearings."
It is the purpose of this note to demonstrate that Congress did
intend to include interspousal electronic surveillance within the
scope of Title III, and that the statute's civil and criminal penalties
should be applicable to spouses found guilty of electronic eavesdrop-
ping on their marital partners. The discussion also emphasizes the
necessity of excluding the fruits of intermarital electronic
surveillance as evidence in domestic proceedings. It is submitted
that these applications of the Act would have a deterrent effect on
interspousal surveillance, an activity which contributes to marital
disharmony and sometimes irreparably damages otherwise viable
marriages. Additionally, it will be shown that applying Title III to
interspousal electronic eavesdropping would have the positive effect
of protecting the privacy of spouses as individuals and would be in
harmony with the trend toward establishing the legal individuality
of marital partners. The note concludes with a description of the
narrow factual circumstances in which the defense of interspousal
immunity should be available, should the courts determine that Title
III does not control intermarital electronic surveillance and that
there is in fact an interspousal exception to Title III. Yet it is the
contention of this note that Congress intended marital electronic
eavesdropping to fall within Title III's flat prohibition on the use of
electronic surveillance devices by private citizens.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND TITLE III
At the center of the legal controversy surrounding interspousal
electronic surveillance is the question of whether Congress intended
to ban electronic surveillance between marital partners when it
passed Title III. The disagreement among the courts has resulted
despite clear language in Title III which proscribes all private in-
terception of wire communications:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this
chapter any person who ...
17. United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976); Simpson v. Simpson,
490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 897 (1974); Remington v. Remington, 393
F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
18. Markham v. Markham, 272 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1973), affg 265 So. 2d 59 (Fla.
App. 1972); In Re Marriage of Lopp, - Ind. __, 378 N.E.2d 414 (1978), rev'g -
Ind. App. -, 370 N.E.2d 977 (1977); Rickenbacker v. Rickenbacker, 290 N.C. 373, 226
S.E.2d 347 (1976); Beaber v. Beaber, 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 322 N.E.2d 910 (1974).
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(a) willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept,
or procures any other person to intercept, any
wire or oral communication;
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both. 9
Notwithstanding this all-inclusive prohibition on private elec-
tronic surveillance, in 1974 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
in Simpson v. Simpson' that Congress did not intend the Act to ban
interspousal wiretapping.2 The Simpson decision was generally
recognized by other courts2 as establishing an interspousal excep-
tion to Title III and went unchallenged until 1976, when the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided the case of United States v.
Jones." In Jones, the court analyzed the legislative history of Title
III and reached the conclusion that Congress did intend to include
the marital relationship within the scope of the Act's prohibition of
electronic surveillance.'
Although both courts conducted extensive studies into the
legislative history of Title III and reviewed essentially the same
materials,'5 they arrived at different conclusions. An understanding
of each court's decision and the disagreement which resulted re-
19. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1)(a) (1970). None of the exceptions delineated in the
chapter include interspousal immunity to Title III.
20. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 897 (1974).
21. Id. at 805.
22. Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1975); United States
v. Schrimscher, 493 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1974); Beaber v. Beaber, 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 322
N.E.2d 910 (1974).
23. 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
24. Id. at 667.
25. The following materials constitute the legislative history of Title III ex-
amined by the courts in Simpson and Jones: Hearings on Wiretapping, the Attorney
General's Program Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962);
Hearings on Invasion of Privacy, Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Pro-
cedure of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. pts. 1-6, (1965-1966); Hear-
ings on Criminal Laws and Procedures, Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); Special In-
quiry on Invasion of Privacy, Before the Special Subcomm. on Invasion of Privacy of
the House Gov't Operation Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Hearings on the Right
of Privacy Act of 1967, Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. pts. 1-2 (1967); Hearings on the Anti-
Crime Program, Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967); Hearings on Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforce-
ment, Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1968); 114 Cong. Rec. 12280-84, 12294-98, 12982-13000,
14469-86, 14693-751, 16274-98 (1968).
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quires a knowledge of the considerations which prompted Congress
to pass Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968.
The Promulgation of Title III
Title III was passed by Congress in a time when government
wiretapping and organized crime were controversial political
issues." The Supreme Court decisions of Berger v. New York,' and
Katz v. United States28 had formulated constitutional standards for
governmental electronic surveillance. Meanwhile, the President's
Crime Commission' had documented the extent of organized crime's
influence and its threat to the nation's well-being." As a result of
this atmosphere the bulk of the legislative testimony, hearings, and
reports regarding Title III was devoted to the use and abuse of elec-
tronic surveillance by the government in regulating organized crime.
Although governmental use of electronic surveillance was the
major focus of Congress in enacting Title III, the use and abuse of
electronic surveillance devices by private citizens did in fact receive
attention in the legislative history of the Act. Within those
materials discussing private electronic surveillance were numerous
references to the problem of interspousal surveillance.' Comments
directed toward intermarital wiretapping included the view of a co-
author of Title III, Senator Roman Hruska: "A broad prohibition is
imposed on private use of electronic surveillance, particularly in
domestic relations and industrial espionage situations." 2 Testimony
26. See, e.g., A. Barth, "Lawless Lawmen," NEW REPUBLIC, July 30, 1966;
R.M. Cipes, "Kennedy, Johnson, and the FBI," NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 24, 1966.
27. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
28. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
29. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
30. Id.
31. See S. REP. No. 1097 at 2180, 2274; Hearings on Invasions of Privacy
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the Sen. Comm. of the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965-66). Senator Long, the Chairman of the subcom-
mittee, identified three major areas where private electronic surveillance was
widespread:
The three large areas of snooping in this field are (1) industrial, (2)
divorce cases, and (3) politics. So far, we have no real justification for con-
tinuance in these three areas. If any justification exists, we will probably
hear about it in the next few weeks as we intend to explore this terrain
thoroughly.
Id. at 2261.
32. S. REP. No. 1097 supra note 5, at 2274.
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by Professor Robert Blakely,' who is generally credited with draft-
ing Title III,' indicated that intermarital surveillance is one of the
two broad areas comprising the bulk of private wiretapping. 5 This
point was corroborated by other testimony in congressional hearings
on Title III.6
Generally, however, the Simpson and Jones courts were assess-
ing the intent of Congress on an issue to which the legislators had
devoted relatively little attention. The paucity of legislative history
regarding private electronic surveillace played a significant role in
the different results reached by the two courts. To the Simpson
court, the relative lack of attention paid to interspousal surveillance
by the legislators suggested that Congress did not intend to prohibit
intermarital electronic surveillance.
Simpson v. Simpson: The Fifth Circuit Finds an Implied Exception
Simpson involved a suspicious husband who placed a wiretap
on the family phone to record his wife's telephone conversations. 7
Subsequent recordings revealed only that Mrs. Simpson was not re-
jecting the advances of another man in a "firm and final fashion."''
Whatever his reasons, the husband played the taped recordings for
various neighbors, family members, and a lawyer. On the lawyer's
advice, Mrs. Simpson agreed to an uncontested divorce. She then filed
suit in federal district court for civil damages under Title III 3 for
33. G. Robert Blakey is a Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame
Law School.
34. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 517-18 n.7 (1974).
35. Hearings on the Right to Privacy Act of 1967 Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 413 (1967).
36. See, e.g., Hearings on the Anti-Crime Program Before Subcomm. on Ad-
min. Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. pt.
1, at 18 (1965-66).
37. 490 F.2d at 804.
38. Id.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970):
Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted,
disclosed, or used in violation of this chapter shall (1) have a civil cause of
action against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures
any other person to intercept, disclose or use such communications, and
(2) be entitled to recover from any such person-
(a) actual damages but not less than liquidated
damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of
violation or $1,000, whichever is higher;
(b) punitive damages; and
(c) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation
costs reasonably incurred.
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the wiretap placed on her telephone conversations. Failing in the
district court, she appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
arguing that her claim was supported by "constitutional protections
of privacy and emerging concepts of women's rights."'"
The Fifth Circuit found the sole issue to be whether Congress
intended in Title III to give one spouse a civil remedy against the
other." This narrowing of the issue reveals that the major concern
of the Simpson court was the impact of Title III upon established
concepts of federalism. The court questioned whether Congress in-
tended to provide a federal remedy for a grievance arising between
marital partners, since domestic conflicts have normally been the
subject of state law.'2 Additionally, the court was concerned that the
doctrine of interspousal immunity," still recognized by a majority of
the states," would be overridden by a finding that Title III provided
Mrs. Simpson with an interspousal remedy and cause-of-action. 5 The
court felt that these considerations of comity and federalism re-
quired that the legislative history be examined to determine if Con-
gress intended Title III's prohibitions to include interspousal
wiretapping.
The Fifth Circuit was also prompted in its examination of the
legislative history of Title III by the criminal penalties available
under the Act."6 Because civil and criminal liability are apparently
coterminous under the provisions of Title III, 7 the Simpson court
emphasized that severe criminal penalties might follow from a find-
40. Id The women's rights argument was considered by the court in
Markham v. Markham, 265 So. 2d 59 (Fla. App. 1972).
41. 490 F.2d at 804.
42. Id at 805.
43. The doctrine of interspousal immunity generally denies personal injury
recoveries between husband and wife. W. PROSSER. HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §
122, at 859-60 (4th ed. 1971).
44. Thirty states and the District of Columbia still recognize interspousal im-
munity, although in many of those jurisdictions the recognition is limited. For a list of
those states, see Comment, Interspousal Electronic Surveillance Immunity, 7 TOL. L.
REV. 185, 190 n.27 (1975).
45. 490 F.2d at 806 n.7.
46. Id at 809.
47. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 5, at 2156, states:
The prohibition, too, must be enforced with all appropriate sanctions.
Criminal penalties have their part to play. But other remedies must be af-
forded the victim of an unlawful invasion of privacy. Provision must be
made for civil recourse for damages. The perpetrator must be denied the
fruits of his unlawful actions in civil and criminal proceedings. Each of
these objectives is sought by the proposed legislation.
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ing that Mr. Simpson was civilly liable for the electronic surveillance
of his wife.48 On that basis, the court felt bound by the principle that
criminal statutes must be strictly construed so as to avoid ensnaring
behavior not meant to be prohibited.49
Based on the principle of strict construction and its own con-
cern over Title III's effect on federalism, the Simpson court sought
an express indication in the legislative history that Congress intended
to include intermarital electronic surveillance within the scope of
the Act. Seeking this "clear expression of intent" by Congress, the
court examined Title III's legislative history and found that only a
small portion of Title III's legislative history was devoted to the
private use of electronic surveillance devices. The relative silence of
Congress on the issue of intermarital surveillance indicated to the
Fifth Circuit that Congress had not contemplated, let alone intended,
that Title III's penalities and prohibitions would be applied to elec-
tronic surveillance between spouses.'
Neither did the legislative history regarding intermarital elec-
tronic surveillance satisfy the positive expression of congressional
intent sought by the Simpson court. The testimony by Professor
Blakely and private investigators regarding the extensive amount of
electronic surveillance between spouses received the following treat-
ment: "These statements suggest Congressional awareness that
private individuals were using electronic surveillance techniques
within their own home. However, they do not support the proposi-
tion that Congress was concerned that such activities took place."'"
Apparently having overlooked Senator Hruska's statement that Ti-
tle III was intended to prohibit the use of electronic surveillance by
marital partners,' the Simpson court did quote passages of
testimony wherein private investigators attempted to justify their
role in interspousal surveillance." An example: "[W]e have found
statistically that once the truth is out in any domestic squabble,
there is a 50% better chance of a couple being reconciled. Every
time we make a case, I practically feel like a surgeon who is cutting
out a cancer."" Thus, even within the portion of Title III's
legislative history devoted to interspousal electronic surveillance, it
48. 490 F.2d at 809.
49. See Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349 (1948).
50. 490 F.2d at 807.
51. Id at 809.
52. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
53. 490 F.2d at 808 n.14.
54. Id.
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was the Fifth Circuit Court's conclusion that Congress had not in-
tendedto ban the use of electronic surveillance devices within the
marital relationship.
While the Fifth Circuit Court did express doubt about its
analysis of congressional intent,"5 it found further support for its
decision in the language of another provision of the Act. Specifically,
the court felt that section 2510 (5)(a)(i),5 1 which exempted from the
scope of Title III all conversations intercepted through the normal
use of an extension phone, indicated Congress did not intend Title
III to include interspousal surveillance. This conclusion was
predicated upon testimony of Professor Herman Schwartz of the
American Civil Liberties Union who stated with respect to the ex-
tension phone exception: "I take it nobody wants to make it a crime
for a father to listen in on his teenage daughter or some such
related problem. . . .But this bill does not go to that and goes
beyond that."7 The court in Simpson considered this testimony in-
dicative of congressional unwillingness to interject Title III's
privacy protections between family members, and concluded that
there was no convincing distinction between an interception achiev-
ed through the normal use of an extension phone and one ac-
complished through a wiretap placed on the phone by a spouse. Both
methods of intercepting communications were permissible, reasoned
55. Id. at 810.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (5)(a)(i) (1970), provides:
(5) 'electronic, mechanical, or other device' means any device or ap-
paratus which can be used to intercept a wire or oral communication
other than-
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or
any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a com-
munications carrier in the ordinary course of its business and being used
by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business....
The language "ordinary course of [the user's] business" was added to the Act after
Professor Herman Schwartz expressed his concern in testimony before the House
Judiciary Committee that the original version of the bill, which did not contain such
language, would allow policemen and private intruders to enter homes and eavesdrop
on extension phones without penalty. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d
Cir. 1977). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held as a matter of law that any
use of an extension phone without authorization or consent to surreptitiously record a
private telephone conversation is not use in the ordinary course of business. United
States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974); accord, Gerrard v. Blackman, 401 F.
Supp. 1189 (N.D. IMI. 1975). But see Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 n.5 (2d
Cir. 1977).
57. Hearings on the Anti-Crime Program before Subcomm. No. 5 of the
House Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 901 (1967).
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the court, since each resulted only in the violation of a fellow family
member's privacy not protected by Title III.58
Having determined that Title III's penalties were not ap-
plicable to interspousal electronic eavesdropping, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals denied Mrs. Simpson a remedy. Apparently unsure
of its determination, the court concluded by limiting its decision to
the particular facts of its case. 9 The Simpson holding went un-
challenged until 1976, when the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided the case of United States v. Jones."'
United States v. Jones: An Alternative to the Simpson Analysis
The factual situation of Jones involved a husband who
suspected his estranged wife of conducting an extramarital affair
and so placed a wiretap on his spouse's telephone. 1 After he had
used recordings of his wife's telephone conversations to obtain a
divorce, criminal charges based on Title III were brought againt him
for the surreptitious interception of her telephone conversations. In
federal district court, the defendant-husband asserted Simpson as
authority for an interspousal exception to the provisions of Title III.
On the basis of Simpson, the district court dismissed the pro-
ceedings, and the government appealed the decision to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals.62 Unwilling to accept the Simpson ra-
tionale on its face, the Sixth Circuit made its own examination of
the legislative intent of Congress in enacting Title III.
The Jones court found the conclusion of the Fifth Circuit in
Simpson to be "questionable";"3 it was the opinion of the Sixth Cir-
cuit that Congress clearly intended Title III to prohibit electronic
surveillance between marital partners." Citing the numerous
references in Title III's legislative history to the use of electronic
surveillance devices in domestic relations cases," the Sixth Circuit
concluded that Congress was both aware of interspousal surveillance
and intended it to be prohibited." As to the significance of the
58. 490 F.2d at 809.
59. Id. at 810.
60. 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
61. Id at 663.
62. Id
63. Id at 671.
64. Id at 667.
65. Id at 667-669.
66. Id
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relatively little attention devoted to private electronic surveillance
in the legislative history of Title III, the Sixth Circuit stated:
We also dispute the implication in Simpson that the
limited attention given to the private electronic
surveillance in the legislative history, relative to that af-
forded surveillance by law enforcement personnel, reflects
Congress' equivocation on the scope of Title III in the
private sector. The more plausible explanation is that it
was the consensus of Congress that there is "no justifica-
tion" for private electronic surveillance so that debate
centered on the more volatile issue of law enforcement
surveillance. This interpretation is consistent with the
pervasive theme of Title III that electronic surveillance
should be sharply curtailed and in no instance be under-
taken without strict judicial authorization and
supervision."
The Sixth Circuit went on to suggest that if Congress had intended
to provide an interspousal exception to Title III, it would have in-
cluded it among those exceptions expressly stated within the
statutory provisions. 8
Although the Jones court directly attacked the Simpson conclu-
sion that Congress did not intend Title III to prohibit interspousal
electronic surveillance, it carefully noted that its decision was
distinguishable from Simpson.9 While Simpson was concerned with
the availability of a civil remedy to a spouse under Title III, Jones
involved the question of whether Title III's criminal penalties were
applicable to a spouse found guilty of wiretapping his marital part-
ner. Since the doctrine of interspousal immunity is a tort concept
and has never been applied to criminal law, 0 the Sixth Circuit's deci-
sion in Jones could not preempt the state tort law doctrine and
result in a conflict between state and federal laws. Instead, as the
Sixth Circuit stated, the fact that one party to the intercepted con-
versation was the spouse of the defendant had "no bearing what-
soever on the availability of criminal penalties."7
67. Id. at 671.
68. Id.
69. Id at 672.
70. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 859 (4th ed. 1964).
71. 542 F.2d at 672. 'The Jones court buttressed its conclusion by the indication in
the legislative history that civil and criminal liability should be coterminous. Id. at 672
n.7, citing S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 5. See note 47 supra.
et al.: Interspousal Electronic Surveillance and Title III
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In addition to this criminal-civil legal distinction between Jones
and Simpson, the Sixth Circuit found the two cases distinguishable
on their facts.2 Prior to the wiretapping in question in Jones, the
husband had separated from his wife and moved out of the marital
home. Subsequent to the separation the wife obtained a restraining
order to prevent the husband from coming onto the premises.73
Under these cricumstances, the Sixth Circuit Court found inap-
plicable the interspousal exception to Title III recognized in Simp-
son,74 where the parties were still residing together at the time of
the surveillance-in-question.
Although the Sixth Circuit distinguished Jones from Simpson
both legally and factually, it did not suggest that the Simpson con-
clusion as to congressional intent was valid. The Sixth Circuit ap-
parently emphasized the legal and factual distinctions between the
two cases for the purpose of establishing alternative bases for its
decision should the Supreme Court later find that Congress did im-
pliedly intend an interspousal exception to Title III. In its conclusion
the Jones court emphasized that it did not agree with the result of
Simpson:
However, the plain language of the section and the Act's
legislative history compels interpretation of the statute to
include interspousal wiretaps. It is not for this court to
question the wisdom of Congress and to establish an im-
plied exception to a federal statute by judicial fiat. 5
On the basis that Congress did not intend an interspousal exception
to Title III, the Sixth Circuit held that the rationale of Simpson did
not control Jones. Accordingly, it reversed the decision of the
district court and remanded the case for trial."
The Better Precedent-Simpson or Jones?
The different conclusions reached in the Jones and Simpson
cases as to the intent of Congress in enacting Title III have left
unsettled the question whether interspousal surveillance is pro-
hibited conduct. The few courts which have addressed the question
in the wake of the conflicting decisions have continued the Simpson-
Jones discord. Absent a Supreme Court decision on the issue, Simp-
72. 542 F.2d at 673.
73. Id.
74. I&
75. I&
76. I&
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son and Jones will continue to serve as bases for separate schools of
case authority. If inconsistency and ad hoc determinations regarding
the applicability of Title III to intermarital surveillance are to be
avoided, courts must scrutinize the opinions of the Jones and Simp-
son courts in order to determine which decision should control
future intermarital surveillance case law.
An analysis of the conflicting Simpson-Jones decisions regard-
ing Title III's applicability to interspousal electronic surveillance
should begin with the recognition that the plain language of the Act
prohibits such conduct. The explicit language of Title III states that
"any person" who violates the prohibition on private electronic
surveillance is liable to punishment "except as otherwise specifically
provided."77 With the exclusion of the extension phone exception
noted by the Simpson court,"8 none of the exceptions included in the
statute relate to private electronic surveillance. The extension
phone exception, which exempts from the scope of Title III all con-
versations intercepted through the normal use of an extension
phone, does not suggest that Congress intended Title III to be inap-
plicable to interspousal wiretapping, as Simpson found. Common
sense suggests the necessity for the extension phone exception to
Title III. Wiretapping statutes must avoid ensnaring the innocent
person who, in the normal use of an extension phone," unwittingly
invades the privacy of another. The deliberate extension phone
eavesdropper operates without electronic devices, is readily detect-
able, and must be present to accomplish his/her aim. On the other
hand, the wiretapper escapes detection and can easily intercept con-
versations while absent from the premises. It is the latter activity
which Congress sought to prohibit, for it is the deliberate and sur-
reptitious qualities of the wiretapper which create the greatest
danger to individual privacy. As the extension phone exception is
the only provision of Title III related to private interception of wire
communication, no statutory construction of Title III reveals a
general interspousal exception to the Act.
The Simpson court, in initiating the statutory interpretation of
Title III, violated the long-standing principle that a court will not
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1) (1970). According to the Senate Report, the definition
of "person" contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (6) (1970), defines the parameters of Title III
to include any individual, corporation, partnership, or other legal entity. The definition
excludes only governmental units and is otherwise intended to be "comprehensive." S.
REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 90-91, reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2179.
78. 490 F.2d at 805.
79. See note 56 supra.
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refer to legislative history for purposes of construction when a
statute is clear on its face.' The Fifth Circuit, as previously noted,81
was prompted in its search of the legislative history by considera-
tions of federalism. In particular, the court pointed to the fact that
Title III, if applied to interspousal surveillance, would preempt the
state doctrine of interspousal immunity still in effect in a majority
of states. The significance attached to the doctrine is questionable.
Since its conception in the common law during the eighteenth
century, the role of the doctrine of interspousal immunity has
steadily diminished.82 Modern-day support for the doctrine is
predicated upon the desire to preserve domestic tranquility and pre-
vent collusive suits,83 policy considerations not present in in-
terspousal wiretapping cases. The role of the doctrine of in-
terspousal immunity as a factor necessitating a determination of
legislative intent was exaggerated by the court in Simpson. As
noted in Jones, Congress could have easily included the doctrine
within the provisions of Title III if it had so intended."
The Simpson court also was concerned that Title III would in-
fringe on the traditional province of the state courts, the law of
domestic relations, if applied to intermarital surveillance. While
there is merit in this consideration, the legislative history of Title
III clearly indicates that Congress was aware of and intended that
the Act should cover electronic surveillance between husband and
wife.8 5 As the Jones opinion revealed, the congressional debate in-
dicates that Congress was concerned with protecting individual
privacy from invasion through electronic surveillance devices, and
that Congress was aware that a significant amount of the private
abuse of electronic surveillance occurs within the marital relation-
ship.8
An example of the abuse of electronic surveillance which Con-
gress sought to curb in Title III occurred in Simpson. After the hus-
band had wiretapped his wife's telephone and recorded her private
80. 542 F.2d at 667; accord, United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961)
(where statutory language is clear, court will not refer to legislative history for pur-
poses of construction). See also C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
48.01, at 182 (4th ed. 1973).
81. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
82. Comment, Toward Abolition of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 36 MONT. L.
REV. 251 (1975).
83. 542 F.2d at 672.
84. Id. at 671.
85. See notes 31-36 supra and accompanying text.
86. Id.
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conversations, which revealed only meager inferences of infidelity,
he played the recordings to various neighbors, family members and
a lawyer. 7 The public humiliation of individuals through the invasion
of their privacy by electronic surveillance devices is an activity that
Congress sought to prohibit, but which is reinforced by court deci-
sions that fail to apply the all-inclusive prohibition of Title III on
private use of electronic surveillance devices.
In the future courts should recognize the invalidity of the
Simpson holding and find in accordance with the plain language of
and legislative intent behind Title III that interspousal electronic
surveillance is prohibited. Decisions which find an interspousal ex-
ception to Title III only encourage abuse of individual privacy rights
between marital partners by making the fruits of interspousal
surveillance admissible in domestic hearings.
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE FRUITS OF INTERSPOUSAL SURVEILLANCE
The purpose of nearly all interspousal electronic surveillance is
to gain evidence for use at divorce, custody, and support hearings.8
Title III requires exclusion of evidence obtained through electronic
surveillance in all judicial proceedings. 9 While Title III apparently
eliminates the incentive for spouses to use electronic surveillance
devices to spy on their marital partners, the courts" which have ap-
87. 490 F.2d at 805.
88. See note 1 supra.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970):
... No part of the contents of such communication and no evidence deriv-
ed therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding in or before any court . . . or other authority of the United
States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if disclosure of that infor-
mation would be in violation of this chapter.
As the court noted in Rickenbacker v. Rickenbacker, 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347, 352
(1976), none of the exceptions to the proscription contained in this chapter of Title III
are applicable to interspousal eletronic surveillance.
90. Rickenbacker v. Rickenbacker, 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (1976); Beaber
v. Beaber, 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 322 N.E.2d 910 (1974). One state court in Markham v.
Markham, 272 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1973), affg 265 So. 2d 59 (Fla. App. 1972), refused to
apply Title III to the question. The determination that state law should determine the
issue was mistakenly based on language in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
which indicated that the protection of the general right of privacy-an individual's
right to be free from the intrusions of other private persons-was the province of the
states. The Markham decision is clearly erroneous, for the Supreme Court held in 1939
that Congress had the power, based on the commerce clause, to regulate intrastate
wiretapping. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939). The court in Simpson
recognized that Congress clearly had the power under the commerce clause to pass
legislation affecting wire communications. 490 F.2d at 805 n.6.
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plied Title III to the question of the admissibility of such evidence
at marital proceedings are not in agreement. In Rickenbacker v.
Rickenbacker,1 the North Carolina Supreme Court applied Title
III's inadmissibility requirement to evidence of spousal infidelity
gained through the use of a wiretap. In Beaber v. Beaber,92 however,
an Ohio court ruled similar evidence was admissible at a domestic
hearing.
Rickenbacker involved a husband and wife who had separated.
The wife continued to occupy the marital premises, but the husband
continued to pay the telephone bills. At his request, the telephone
company installed an extension phone in his office to which he at-
tached a sound-activated tape recorder, obstensibly for the purpose
of determining if his estranged wife was referring his business calls
to his office. Subsequent recordings revealed that the wife was
engaged in adulterous conduct. To defeat her claim for alimony, the
husband sought to introduce the taped conversations into evidence.
The wife filed a motion to suppress the evidence based on Title III,
while the husband relied on Simpson to support his contention that
Title III's inadmissibility requirement was inapplicable.93
The North Carolina Surpeme Court held that the evidence was
inadmissible since it had been obtained through the use of electronic
surveillance prohibited by Title III. In reaching its decision, the
court employed analysis virtually identical to that shortly thereafter
used by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Jones."5 The North Carolina Supreme Court noted that the plain
language of Title III prohibited interspousal electronic surveillance
Immediately prior to the publication of this note, the Indiana Supreme Court
became the third tribunal to rule on this question. In re Marriage of Lopp, - Ind.
-, 378 N.E.2d 414 (1978), rev'g __ Ind. App. -, 370 N.E.2d 977 (1977). Mr. Lopp
had obtained recordings of his wife's telephone conversations through the use of elec-
tronic surveillance, and Mrs. Lopp contended that threats of disclosure of the tapes'
contents coerced her signature on a provisional custody order. Indiana's highest court
held that the trial judge properly admitted the tapes into evidence for the purpose of
determining the validity of Mrs. Lopp's claim that she had been blackmailed. Id. at
422. The court expressly limited its decision to the particular facts of its case, and
noted that a contrary decision would lead to "an illogical and absurd result" not intended
by Congress. Id. The Lopp opinion provides a lengthly analysis of the controversy sur-
rounding the applicability of Title III to interspousal electronic surveillance.
91. 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (1976).
92. 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 322 N.E.2d 910 (1974).
93. 226 S.E.2d at 348, 351.
94. Id. at 352.
95. 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
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and concluded that Congress had intended to prohibit such conduct
in its passage of the Act. Although the court in Rickenbacker
carefully distinguished Simpson, it nevertheless characterized the
Simpson decision as "patently doubtful.""
Two years prior to the Rickenbacker decision, however, an
Ohio court in Beaber v. Beaber97 based its decision that evidence ob-
tained through interspousal electronic surveillance was admissible
on the Simpson conclusion that Title III did not apply to in-
terspousal wiretapping. If Title III did not apply to interspousal
wiretapping, the Beaber court reasoned, then the question of the ad-
missibility of the fruits of interspousal surveillance was not govern-
ed by the inadmissibility requirement of the Act." Accordingly, that
court admitted the evidence under the long-standing general princi-
ple that absent any statutory provision to the contrary, evidence ob-
tained, whether legally or illegally, by a private person is admissible
in a marital proceeding."
In addition to basing its opinion on the authority of Simpson,
the Beaber court emphasized that the evidence should be admissible
on the general proposition that "what occurs behind the marital veil
is and should be the private concern of the marital partners."1" An
errant spouse who violates the marriage contract within the con-
fines of the home and so avoids the scrutiny of the public, the court
reasoned, should be subject to exposure through any means
available to the other spouse."' The court concluded that an exclu-
sion of evidence gained through interspousal wiretapping would
deprive a spouse of the "only material, creditable [sic] evidence" '
available as to the errant spouse's infidelity.
The decision of the Beaber court, within its particular factual
context, is an appealing application of equity principles. The in-
tercepted conversations in Beaber revealed that the wife was involv-
ed in an extramarital affair."0 3 It was the wife, however, who had fil-
ed for divorce, claiming gross neglect and extreme cruelty. For im-
peachment purposes, the court admitted the taped conversations
96. 226 S.E.2d at 352.
97. 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 322 N.E.2d 910 (1974).
98. 322 N.E.2d at 914.
99. See, e.g., Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 255 N.Y.S.2d 803, 203 N.E.2d
481 (1964) (analyzed in 5 A.L.R.3d 664).
100. 322 N.E.2d at 915.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 914.
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which revealed her infidelity and buttressed her husband's cross-
complaint for divorce.' Thus, the Beaber decision represents the
general equity principle that the court will not reward the plaintiff
who has contributed to the conflict,105 and thus satisfied the common
morality and sense of justice.
While the Beaber court admitted the evidence for purposes of
impeachment, it emphasized that the fruits of interspousal electronic
surveillance should be admitted in domestic hearings for direct
evidentiary purposes."' Both rationales for the Beaber court's deci-
sion are arguments for the admissibility of evidence gained through
interspousal surveillance, and are not limited to admissibility for im-
peachment purposes only. Beaber thus stands for the proposition
that all evidence gained through the use of electronic surveillance
devices by a spouse is or should be admissible at domestic hearings.
As a result of the Beaber decision an incentive remains for in-
dividual spouses to use electronic surveillance to spy on their
marital partners. Since the major purpose of most interspousal
surveillance is to gain evidence for use at domestic hearings,"' had
the court held such evidence inadmissible it would have discouraged
the surreptitious electronic surveillance between spouses.
The consequence of Beaber is unfortunate, for in particular cir-
cumstances the result of interspousal surveillance may be to ir-
reparably damage otherwise viable marriages. As in Simpson, the
conversations intercepted by a spouse's use of electronic
surveillance devices may reveal only the most meager inferences of
infidelity. Nonetheless, these inferences, even if baseless, may in-
crease or create marital distrust and disharmony. The more fragile
the marital relationship, for whatever reason, the greater the
likelihood that the meager inference of infidelity will be a cause for
divorce. Generally, marital harmony or disharmony will not be
determined by whether the courts admit the fruits of interspousal
104. Id.
105. The principle was discussed in relation to governmental wiretapping in
Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438 (1928):
The governing principle has long been settled. It is that a court will not
redress a wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands. The
maxim of unclean hands comes from courts of equity. But the principle
prevails also in courts of law. Its common application is in civil actions
between private parties.
Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
106. 322 N.E.2d at 915.
107. A. WESTIN. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 111 (1967).
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surveillance. However, in making their decisions, the courts should
recognize that admissibility sustains the incentive for spouses to
engage in an activity which may result in the needless breakdown of
some marriages.
Due process considerations perhaps provide a more compelling
reason for courts to find that the fruits of interspousal electronic
surveillance are inadmissible in domestic hearings. At stake in most
domestic hearings is the disposition of the parties' property in-
terests, which should be accorded the due process safeguard of a
fair hearing. As in Rickenbacker, where the husband sought to in-
troduce taped recordings of his wife's telephone conversations to
defeat her alimony claims, ' the admission of such illegally obtained
evidence would very likely affect the resulting property settlement.
In fact, Congress specifically incorporated the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment as a basis of constitutional support for
its passage of Title III.1"9 In domestic hearings, courts should heed
the due process rights of spouses to property and deny the admis-
sion of evidence gathered through surreptitious electronic means.
Rather than following the Beaber decision courts should adhere
to the rationale of Rickenbacker and apply Title III's inadmissibility
requirement to evidence obtained through interspousal electronic
surveillance. Such decisions would discourage the use of electronic
surveillance devices and protect the privacy of individuals in com-
munications which Congress sought to guard in Title III, as well as
the due process rights to property guaranteed by the Constitution.
PRIVACY AND THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP
The enactment of Title III and the use of surveillance techni-
ques within the marital home has placed a difficult legal question
before the courts: Should a spouse have a statutory right of privacy
against his/her marital partner? Both legally and socially, the
marital relationship has been traditionally and ideally viewed as an
intimate and sharing institution. Mutuality and trust, regarded as
keystones of the relationship, involve a considerable sacrifice of in-
dividuality for the good of the marital relationship. Each partner
necessarily and voluntarily relinquishes a great deal of individual
privacy, but it is arguable whether the marital vows should implied-
108. 226 S.E.2d at 348.
109. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2180. See generally Comment, Interspousal Immunity is not a
Defense in Criminal Prosecution for Wiretaping- United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d
661 (6th Cir. 1976), 11 SUFF. U.L. REV. 1367, 1370 n.26 (1977).
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ly extend to a spouse the right to surreptitiously intercept the
marital partner's conversations with third parties. Regardless of in-
dividual viewpoints on that question, it was the statutory directive
of Congress that Title III was applicable to all individuals who
violated its provisions. Congress was aware that a significant extent
of private use of electronic surveillance occurred between marital
partners, but did not include it among the activities excepted from
the Act's coverage. Yet despite the clear language of the Act, some
courts have balked at applying the Act to interspousal surveillance.
This reluctancy may stem from an unwillingness to protect an in-
dividual spouse's privacy against intrusion by the marital partner.
Because the concept of individual privacy is so contradictory to the
mutuality and openness of the marital relationship, the courts have
been understandably hesitant to apply Title III to interspousal
surveillance.
The law, however, has slowly come to recognize the legal and
personal individuality of each partner in the marital relationship. "
Similarly, the importance of individual privacy has recently gained
increasing recognition."1 Consequently, while individual privacy pro-
tections may at first glance seem an anathema to traditional con-
cepts of marriage, the courts have recognized the need to afford in-
dividual spouses legal protection against the marital partner.
Legal Individuality within the Marital Relationship
Within the case law involving interspousal wiretapping and
Title III, very little attention has been given to the question of
whether a spouse should have a statutory right of privacy against
his/her marital partner. The apparent reluctance of the courts to ex-
amine the issue of interspousal privacy is in keeping with the com-
mon law unwillingness to impose the law into the marital relation-
ship." 2 The common law "unity" concept of marriage regarded hus-
band and wife as "one." ' This approach led to the development of
110. The historical development of the legal individuality of marital partners is
traced in K. DECROW, SEXIST JUSTICE (1974). The recent Supreme Court decisions in
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, (1976), and
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), represent the extent to which the legal in-
dividuality of marital partners has been recognized. See notes 125-30 infra and accom-
panying text.
111. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
112. This reluctance received a constitutional foundation in Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
113. See, e.g., Comment, Interspousal Electronic Surveillance Immunity, 7
TOL. L. REV. 180, 191 n.32 (1975).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 3 [1978], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol12/iss3/3
1978] INTERSPOUSAL ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 557
the tort doctrine of interspousal immunity,"' which denied civil ac-
tions between husband and wife, and to the legal conclusion that a
married woman had no legal identity."1 5 Marriage, particularly for
the woman, involved a surrender of individual legal rights.
Only recently did the law begin to recognize the legal in-
dividuality of spouses. In 1960, the Supreme Court in United States
v. Dege"' held that husband and wife are capable of conspiring with
each other to commit an offense against the United States, despite a
federal statute 1 7 which rejected the idea. Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
for the majority, wrote:
Such an immunity to husband and wife as a pair of con-
spirators would have to attribute to Congress one of the
two assumptions: either that responsibility of husband and
wife for joint participation in a criminal enterprise would
make for marital disharmony, or that a wife must be
presumed to act under the coercive influence of her hus-
band, and, therefore, cannot be a willing participant."'
The statutory presumption that a women acts under the coercive in-
fluence of her husband,"' Frankfurter felt, "implies a view of
American womanhood offensive to the ethos of our society."" The
Supreme Court's decision thus recognized not only that each spouse
was an individual capable of his/her own thoughts and actions, but
also that the individuality of marital partners should be accorded
legal recognition."'
Recent legal developments have continued the trend. A majori-
114. Id. at 193.
115. Id.
116. 364 U.S. 51 (1960).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1948) (criminal conspiracy statute).
118. 364 U.S. at 52.
119. On the doctrine of presumed coercion, see People v. Stately, 91 Cal. App.
2d 943, 206 P.2d 76 (1949). For an interesting look at those factors which the courts
used to prop up the doctrine, see K. DE CROW, SEXIST JUSTICE 157 (1974).
120. 364 U.S. at 53.
121. Id. at 55. The trend toward legal individuality of marital partners actually
began with the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts. See C. VERNIER. 3
AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 167, 179-180 (1938). First passed in Mississippi in 1839, similar
legislation was later adopted in all American jurisdictions. See State v. Gardner, 174
Iowa 748, 156 N.W. 747 (1916). The effects of the legislation are discussed in L.
KANOWITZ. WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1969). According to
Warren, Husband's Rights to Wife's Services, 38 HARV. L. REV. 421, 423 (1925),
however, the effect of the legislation was limited: "The interpretation of the Married
Women's Acts frequently fell into the hands of judges who as young lawyers had been
educated in the legal supremacy of the husband."
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ty of states now recognize a wife's right to sue for loss of consor-
tium.'22 The doctrine of interspousal immunity has been abrogated
by twenty states.'23 The Equal Opportunity Credit Act of 1976 ex-
tended the opportunity for married women to acquire credit in their
own right.'24 While the trend toward legal individuality of marital
partners has not gone unchecked, 2 the law clearly no longer
regards husband and wife as a single legal entity.
The individual rights of marital partners were analyzed by the
Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Dan-
forth'2' and Eisenstadt v. Baird."7 In Danforth, the Court ruled that
a wife was not required to acquire her husband's consent prior to
terminating her pregnancy. While the Court recognized that its deci-
sion might have a profound and negative impact on the future of
particular marriages,'28 it felt that "the goal of fostering mutuality
and trust in a marriage, and of strengthening the marital relation-
ship and the marriage institution" would best be served by denying
the husband the power to veto his wife's decision to have an abor-
tion."
In Eisenstadt v. Baird the Supreme Court examined the
privacy right as it related to married and single people. The Court
found no distinction:
It is true that in Griswold the right to privacy inhered in
the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an
independent entity with a heart and mind of its own, but
an association of two individuals each with a separate in-
tellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental in-
122. See, e.g., Lombardo v. D.G. Fransisco & Co., 359 Mass. 529, 269 N.E.2d
836, 839 (1971).
123. See Comment, Interspousal Electronic Surveillance Immunity, 7 TOL. L.
REV. 185, 190 n.27 (1975).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1976).
125. See Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ala. 1971), affd per
curiam, 405 U.S. 970 (1972), in which the Supreme Court upheld a state requirement
that all married women use their husband's surname on their driver's license.
126. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
127. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
128. 428 U.S. at 71.
129. I
130. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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trusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision to bear or beget a child."'1
Eisenstadt's recognition of the independent nature of each spouse's
privacy right is significant for it is the distinct nature of every in-
dividual's personal makeup that makes vital the protection of each
person's privacy.132 It was on that basis that the individual's privacy
has been given constitutional protection from governmental intru-
sion, and it was for this reason the common law long ago refused to
sanction private eavesdropping."3
The recent passage of Title III legislation was the attempt of
Congress to prevent the widespread abuse of individual privacy
through governmental and private use of electronic surveillance.' 1
In applying its provisions to factual situations involving interspousal
surveillance, the courts should regard as determinative the question
of whether the intermarital surveillance violated a spouse's right to
privacy. The adoption of this approach by the courts would
recognize the legal individuality of each spouse and serve the intent
of Congress by providing the statutory privacy protections of Title
III to each individual spouse.
Title III and Intermarital Privacy
Title III's provisions prohibit the interception of all "wire" com-
munications,35 and make illegal the interception of all "oral"' 3 com-
131. Id at 453.
132. For a thorough discussion of the functions of individual privacy, see A.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 32-52 (1967). See also Jourard, Some Psychological
Aspects of Privacy, 31 J. LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 307 (1966); A. MASLOW, MOTIVATION
AND PERSONALITY 212-13, 227, 237 (1954); Berle, The Protection of Privacy, 79 POL. SCI.
Q. 162-68 (1964).
133. Eaves-Droppers, or such as listen under walls or windows or the
eaves of a house, to harken after discourse, and thereupon to frame
slanderous and mischievous tales, are a common nuisance and presentable
at the court-leet; or are indictable at the sessions, and punishable by fine
and finding sureties for their good behavior.
4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 168.
134. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1) (1970).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2) (1970). The question of whether or not the Court will
rule that intrastate electronic eavesdropping has such a significant effect on interstate
commerce so that the Act applies to all eavsdropping activities by private parties re-
mains for future determination. Another possible basis for applying this Act to all
eavesdropping activity is through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
if the Court concludes that wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping violates the in-
dividual's right to due process. See Note, Electronic Surveillance: The New Stan-
dards, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 49, 62 (1968).
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munications which the speaker could reasonably expect to remain
private. The statutory distinction between wire and oral communica-
tions was necessitated by the different privacy considerations in-
volved in each form of communication. Wire communications
primarily refers to conversations conducted over the telephone.
Because the communication is sent over the wire, the participants
do not expect their conversation to be overheard. In enacting Title
III, Congress recognized and protected the privacy of persons com-
municating over the telephone by prohibiting all interceptions of
wire communications. All oral communications, however, are not
protected, since they are not sent through enclosed wire, but in-
stead are projected through the air. These communications, ex-
emplified by the everyday conversation on the streetcorner or
within the home, are 'capable of being overheard depending on the
circumstances surrounding the conversations. In order to avoid
ensnaring the unintentional and innocent overhearer within the pro-
visions of Title III, Congress adopted the guidelines of Katz v.
United States,37 and made illegal only those interceptions of oral
communications which, according to the particular factual cir-
cumstances, the speaker could reasonably expect to remain private.
The difficulty in imposing Title III's statutory protection of
privacy on intermarital relationships is not in the interception of
wire communications by a spouse, since all private wiretapping was
prohibited by Congress. Rather, the difficulty will be in determining
which. interceptions of a spouse's oral communications merit Title
III's privacy protections. Title III makes illegal only those intercep-
tions of oral communications- those communications not transferred
by wire'-which the speaker could reasonably expect to remain
private.' This provision of Title III has not been tested in the
courts in an intermarital context.
There are obvious difficulties in determining the circumstances
in which a court should find that a spouse's reasonable expectation
of privacy was violated by the marital partner. Marital partners en-
joy joint access and control of the marital premises. This close
physical relationship, accompanied by the intimacy of the personal
relationship between spouses, leaves little room for a reasonable ex-
pectation that conversations conducted within the home will remain
private. Within the marital home, Title III's protection of oral con-
versations should thus be narrowly applied to extreme factual situa-
137. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2) (1970).
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tions in which a spouse's privacy expectation was clearly justified.
When spouses physically separate outside the marital home,
however, their individual privacy expectations vis-a-vis each other
justifiably increase. Depending on particular factual circumstances,
the courts should protect the privacy of a spouse's conversations
outside the marital home from the intrusion of the other spouse.
In addition to the place where the intercepted conversation oc-
curred, courts should consider whether artificial devices were used
to achieve the interception. Such sophisticated technological devices
as parabolic microphones,"9 bugging devices and spike mikes,"'° pro-
vide the greatest opportunities for a suspicious spouse to surrep-
titiously invade a marital partner's private oral conversations. Once
installed, the spike mike or bug does not require monitoring. Ac-
tivated by sound, the devices intercept and record conversations
within their perimeter. The parabolic microphone, commonly known
as the "big ear," has the ability to intercept conversations taking
place over two hundred yards away. The danger of these devices is
that their presence goes undetected. Like the wiretap, they violate
the individual's expectation that his/her communication will remain
private. Their use in interspousal surveillance should be regarded as
a violation of a spouse's "reasonable expectation of privacy" and
necessitate the protection of the interspousal right to privacy.
In the future, courts may confront factual situations in which it
will be difficult to determine whether a spouse was justified in
his/her expectation of privacy. Focusing on the place where the in-
tercepted conversation originated and whether electronic means
were used to accomplish the interception should aid the courts in
determining whether to protect the privacy of the oral communica-
tion.
Congress, in enacting Title III, was intent on protecting the
privacy of the individual's communications. The courts should not
shrink from giving these statutory privacy protections to spouses
who have been the victims of intermarital surveillance. The
Supreme Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird.' emphasized that the law
139. This device is similar to a directional microphone. It can easily pick up
speech at a distance of 500 to 600 feet. Larger directional microphones increase this
range considerably. See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 76 (1970).
140. Spike mikes are attached to the opposite side of the wall of the room in
which the conversation to be intercepted will take place. The wall acts as a sounding
board, sending acoustical vibrations through thin metallic shafts to a microphone. A
recorder can be attached to make a permanent record of the intercepted conversation.
Id at 75.
141. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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now recognizes each spouse as an individual whose personal needs
and emotional well-being require individual privacy protections. The
courts' application of Title III to interspousal surveillance will
respect those individual privacy rights. If, however, the courts con-
tinue to recognize an interspousal exception to Title III as establish-
ed by Simpson, the application of the exception should be limited to
narrow factual circumstances.
FACTUAL LIMITATIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF THE INTERSPOUSAL
EXCEPTION
Despite the doubtful nature of the Simpson court's determination of
congressional intent, some courts... have recognized it as authority
for the existence of an interspousal exception to Title III. However,
each subsequent decision has factually distinguished Simpson and
ruled the interspousal wiretap in question to be within the scope of
federal wiretap law. The impetus for these determinative factual
distinctions was provided by Simpson itself. In concluding its opinion,
that court expressed uncertainty over its decision:
Our decision is, of course, limited to the specific facts of
this case. No public official is involved, nor is any private
person other than the appellee, and the locus in quo does
not extend beyond the marital home of the partes"'
Subsequent to Simpson, courts have suggested as relevant factual
considerations the relationship of the parties, the presence or
absence of third-party involvement in the surveillance, and the locus
in quo, or place in which the interception of the communication oc-
curred.
In examining factual distinctions which have been employed by
the courts, it is necessary to remember that if there is no in-
terspousal exception to Title III, all distinctions of fact are mean-
ingless since all private wiretapping is prohibited. Where in-
terspousal immunity is a valid defense to Title III, however, it is
necessary to analyze the circumstances in which the defense should
be available.
Relationship of the Parties
In the wake of Simpson, some courts have attached significance
to the relationship of the parties. By definition, the doctrine of in-
142. Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Beaber v.
Beaber, 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 322 N.E.2d 90 (1975).
143. 490 F.2d at 810.
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terspousal immunity applies only where one spouse has brought a
civil action against the other marital partner. " Thus, in United
States v. Schrimscher,4 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found
the defendant's wiretapping of his former lover's phone to be in
violation of Title III. The court noted that in the absence of a
marital relationship, the defendant had no legal right to be on the
premises.' While physical trespass is not required by Title III to in-
voke the statutory prohibitions of the Act, the Schrimscher court
used the trespass of the defendant to buttress its holding and em-
phasized that the nature of the relationship between the parties was
a determinative factor in its decision. A similar analysis was
employed by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Jones.' Six months
prior to the wiretapping activity in question, the defendant wiretap-
per had moved out of the marital home. During this state of separa-
tion, a restraining order was issued to keep the defendant away
from his estranged wife's premises. Noting the restraining order
and labeling the marriage as "one in name more than fact,"'4 8 the
Jones court found the implied statutory exception of Simpson inap-
plicable.
While the Jones decision was based in part on the fact that the
interspousal surveillance in question had occurred after the husband
and wife separated, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently
found in Anonymous v. Anonymous'49 that Title III's remedies were
not available to a wife whose telepone conversations were covertly
intercepted and recorded by her husband after the spouses had
separated."' Although the court in Anonymous limited its decision
to the particular facts of its case, 5' the court's complete disregard
for the fact that the estranged husband and wife occupied separate
premises and were marital partners only in the legal sense implicit-
ly challenges the determination of the court in Jones that separated
marital partners are subject to the prohibitions and penalties of
Title III.
In cases which involve electronic surveillance between
separated marital partners courts should consider whether the
144. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 859-60 (4th ed.
1971).
145. 493 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1974).
146. Id. at 851.
147. 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
148. Id. at 673.
149. 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977), affg London v. London, 420 F. Supp. 944
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
150. Id at 679.
151. Id.
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marital relationship present is "one more in name than fact," as the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals so characterized the status of the
separated spouses in Jones.152 Marriage "in fact" elevates physcial
and psychological intimacy and openness at the expense of each
spouse's individual privacy, and courts are thus understandably
reluctant to inject Title III's sanctions into the relationship. When
marital partners separate, however, the reasons for hesitating to
apply the Act's privacy protections are erased. Each partner then
acts as an individual and no longer is party to an intimate and shar-
ing relationship, so each separated spouse should be given the full
privacy protections of Title III. Furthermore, as commentators have
long argued, 15 the policy arguments used to support interspousal im-
munity are invalid when applied to separated spouses. Not only has
the danger of a collusive suit been minimized, but the domestic tran-
quility of the partners has vanished and cannot be adversely af-
fected by litigation."
If an interspousal exception to Title III exists, it seems clear
that the exception should not be applicable to factual situations in-
volving wiretapping between lovers or separated spouses. Rather,
the application of interspousal immunity should continue to be nar-
rowly applied to husbands and wives who have maintained the
domestic felicity and intimacy that is tantamount to a surrender of
individual privacy.
Third-Party Involvement
Interspousal surveillance which involves the intrusion of a
third party into the marital relation is proscribed activity, according
to case law decided under Title III. This determination, first ex-
pressed in Simpson,' 5 has merit. The relationship of the marital
partners has long been viewed, both socially and legally,"5M as one
which should be free from public scrutiny and concern. What occurs
behind the marital veil is the private concern of husband and wife."5
On the basis that third party involvement would violate the privacy
of the spousal relationship, the court in Simpson expressed the opi-
nion that a "third-party intrusion into the marital home would clear-
ly make the wiretapping activity illegal, even if instigated by the
152. 542 F.2d at 673.
153. See, e.g., H. CLARK. LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 253 (1966).
154. I&
155. 490 F.2d at 809.
156. Beaber v. Beaber, 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 322 N.E.2d 910, 915 (1974).
157. Id.
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other spouse."'58 The particular language employed by the Simpson
court is significant because the court applied its literal meaning to
the facts of the case. In Simpson, the husband conducted the
surveillance of his wife and played the recordings of his wife's
telephone conversations to various neighbors, family members, and
a lawyer. Apparently because the husband had not involved a third-
party in the surveillance of his wife, the court accorded him the
defense of interspousal immunity to the Title III action brought by
his wife.
While it is questionable whether Congress intended to incor-
porate the interspousal exception discovered by the Simpson court,
it is clear that Congress intended to protect individual privacy. 5' If
the husband in Simpson cannot be said to have violated his wife's
statutory privacy by wiretapping her conversations, it seems clear
that he still violated her privacy by playing the taped recordings of
her conversations to third parties. The Simpson court's failure to
recognize that exposure of the fruits of the surveillance to third par-
ties was a violation of Title III's individual privacy protection
subverted the intent of Congress.
The Fifth Circuit appears to have reached this incongruous
result because of a misplaced emphasis on the importance of the
physical areas of the marital home, rather than the marital relation-
ship. The justification for an interspousal exception to Title III does
not arise because of the physical area of the marital home, but
rather from the intimate nature of the interspousal marital relation-
ship. Third-party surveillance, when instigated by a spouse is equal-
ly as objectionable if accomplished, for instance, by a wiretap on the
marital partner's office phone, as it would be as if it were achieved
by a wiretap on the phone located within the marital home. In each
case the husband would be guilty of violating the trust and con-
fidence of the marital relationship, which is the basis for an
interspousal exception to the privacy protections of Title III. In
Simpson, the husband's exposure of the fruits of the wiretap to
third parties was as violative of his wife's privacy as if he had
employed a third party to conduct the surveillance.
In Remington v. Remington," both forms of third-party in-
volvement-surveillance and exposure to the fruits of the
surveillance -were instigated by the defendant-spouse. While the
158. 490 F.2d at 809.
159. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
160. 393 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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Remington court did not attribute its decision to either form of
third-party involvement, it regarded the widespread involvement of
third parties to be a "gross invasion of the wife's privacy."'
Although the Remington court did not question the Simpson result,
the decision reflects the approach courts should take toward third-
party involvement instigated by a spouse. Any third-party involve-
ment instigated by a spouse that violates the privacy of the marital
partner, whether by third-party surveillance or by exposure of the
fruits of the surveillance to third parties, should bring the wiretap
within the scope of Title III.
This approach would give the individual marital partner the
statutory privacy protections which Congress intended, and it would
also prevent an abuse of privacy which is peculiar to electronic
surveillance. Not only can the wiretap intercept the conversation at
the moment it occurs, the wiretap can also record the conversation
and preserve it for other uninvited ears not present at the moment
of interception. A refusal to sanction one spouse's exposure of the
recorded conversations of the marital partner to third parties will
serve the congressional attempt to curb the peculiar capacity of
electronic surveillance to abuse individual privacy.
The Locus in Quo
One of the more questionable factual considerations which has
been recognized by the courts in interspousal wiretapping cases
involves the locus in quo."' The factual element was initially
recognized by the Simpson court," apparently for the purpose of
establishing the wiretap in that case as a purely interspousal con-
cern. That court's recognition of the interspousal exception to Title
III was buttressed by the fact that both the wife's conversation and
the husband's interception of her conversation occurred within the
marital premises. Although the Simpson statement regarding the
locus in quo has been noted by other courts,"u that factor has not
played a determinative role in any case subsequent to Simpson. It is
questionable whether either the location of a spouse's conversation
or the place of the wiretap should significantly influence a court's
161. Id at 901.
162. Locus in quo refers to the place in which the cause of action arose.
BLACK-S LAW DICTIONARY 1090 (4th ed. 1968). Within the context of electronic
surveillance, it refers to either the place where the intercepted conversation
originated, or to where the interception occurred.
163. 490 F.2d at 810.
164. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 667, 673 (6th Cir. 1976).
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determination that particular interspousal surveillance does or does
not fall within the exception to Title III recognized by Simpson.
The court in Jones was not convinced "that the location of the
surveillance device had any relevance in ascertaining the scope of
the statute."'6 5 Indeed, whether a suspicious spouse installs a
surveillance device within the confines of the home or attaches it to
the telephone line just off the marital property seems to be a mean-
ingless distinction.
Similarly, while the location from which the intercepted conver-
sation originated might appear to have significance, it is important
to note that the application of the doctrine of interspousal immunity
has never been determined by the locus in quo. 6 Since the validity
of the interspousal exception to Title III is premised upon the
intimacy and openness of the intermarital relationship, attaching
legal significance to the place where the intercepted conversation
originated would be irrelevant to the original basis of the in-
terspousal exception. Interspousal immunity to Title III provisions
implies that no privacy protections are warranted between spouses.
That determination, again, is based on the nature of the marital
relationship, which does not vary with the physical location of the
spouses.
In summary, if the courts continue to recognize the in-
terspousal exception to Title III established by the Fifth Circuit in
Simpson, the application of the exception should be limited to nar-
row factual circumstances. The courts should not consider the locus
in quo in determining whether interspousal immunity is a valid
defense for a particular wiretapping defendant. Neither the location
of the surveillance device nor the place wherein the intercepted con-
versation originated bears relevance to a determination of the scope
of Title III. Courts should, however, recognize as significant factual
considerations regarding the relationship of the parties and the
presence or absence of third-party involvement. Only in those fac-
tual situations where interspousal wiretapping has occurred be-
tween marital partners, free of any third-party involvment that
violates the privacy of a martial partner, should interspousal im-
munity be a valid defense to a Title III action. This narrow applica-
165. Id.
166. Those policy reasons which have been used to support interspousal im-
munity are not related to a particular place, but rather arise out of the nature of the
marital relationship. For an outline of the policy arguments in support of interspousal
immunity, see H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 253 (1968).
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tion of the interspousal exception best serves the purposes of Con-
gress in enacting Title III.
CONCLUSION
It is probable the future will see an increase in interspousal
electronic surveillance. Within a society plagued by increasing
marital disharmony, technological developments in electronics will
provide suspicious spouses with an increased capacity to intercept
and record the infidelity and inferences of infidelity of marital part-
ners. Present case law will support the use of electronic surveillance
devices between spouses and allow the fruits of interspousal
eavesdropping to be admitted as evidence in divorce, custody, and
support hearings.
The courts' response to interspousal electronic surveillance
should be to remove the incentive for spouses to engage in elec-
tronic surveillance. The courts should hold that the fruits of in-
terspousal surveillance are not admissible in any judicial proceeding,
and courts should apply those civil and criminal penalties contained
in Title III to spouses who use electronic surveillance to intercept
their marital partners' conversations. This response by the courts
would work to deter interspousal electronic surveillance, and pro-
tect the individual privacy in communications which Congress in-
tended in Title III.
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